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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
PHERREL DRAPER and NELL FAIRBANKS
DRAPER, his wife, J. B. DUNN and JULIET
CRISMAN DUNN, his wife, JACK C. DUNN
and GLADYS WILEY DUNN, his wife, GLEN
DRAPER and LORNA F. DRAPER, his wife,
R. L. REINSIMAR
and MARGARET
DRAPER REINSIMAR, his wife, ERNEST
J. PEDLER and VIRGINIA A. PEDLER,
his wife, HENRY L. BUTLER and VIVIENNE
DRAPER BUTLER, his wife, and CHARLES
P. RUDD and GLADYS M. RUDD, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No.
7685

— vs. —
J. B. and R. E. WALKER, INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was commenced in October, 1949, by the
plaintiffs, all of whom except Charles P. Eudd and
Gladys M. Eudd, the last named plaintiffs in the caption,
were represented at the trial by MuUiner, Prince, and
MuUiner, Mr. and Mrs. Eudd were represented by Irwin
Clawson. The case went to trial in the fall of 1950.
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As the trial developed it appeared that two distinct
features of this nuisance were involved. The first was
the matter of dust, noise and light as a nuisance. The
second was a matter of the obliteration of a right of way.
The factual situations as to each of these two problems
were quite distinct, and for that reason they have been
on this appeal briefed separately. This brief will only be
concerned with the nuisance factor inasmuch as the problems of easements did not concern the clients represented
by the writer hereof.
The nuisance issue concerns questions and errors
argued on this point by respondent as point II and point
III of its brief. After consideration, counsel for respondents were of the opinion that their respective positions
could be put more distinctly if the factual situation on
these two law points was stated and argued separately.
Prior to making this statement, the attention of this
court is directed to the fact that no exception is made,
nor has error been assigned, on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the findings of the court
to the effect that a nuisance was committed and existed
as alleged in the complaint. Therefore, the character and
the sufficiency of the evidence as presented will not be
discussed except incidentally.
Plaintiffs take exception to a number of assertions
made in appellant's statement of facts as contained in
its brief. These will be alluded to at the conclusion of
this Statement of Facts.

2
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The site of this controversy is at the mouth of Cottonwood Canyon, a few hundred yards east of the Old
Mill property. Plaintiffs, their parents and families settled in this particular district in the early 1920's. The
homes were originally summer homes, but over the years
were converted to comfortable, permanent houses with all
modern conveniences. Their particular district was
heavily wooded, with the advantage of the coolness incident to their proximity to the canyon in the summer.
The area was also especially desirable because of the
peace, quiet and isolation which these people sought and
desire, and which motivated them to choose this particular place to live.
In the summer of 1946, without any notice to plaintiffs or without any preliminary negotiations with them,
defendant commenced work in establishing a very extensive sand and gravel crushing and processing plant.
J. B. Walker was the only person regularly employed
by defendant who testified at the trial. He is and was
the general manager of defendant and the guiding factor
in developing this operation. In his direct examination
he testified that the beginning of construction commenced
in June of 1946 and that in June and July of that year
the pit floor was prepared by removing the underbrush,
grading and changing the course of cottonwood creek.
Mr. Walker referred extensively to notes which purported to convey accurate data. His purpose was obvious
in that he tried to make it appear that his activities in
this particular area had been going on for some time

3
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prior to this suit. The fact of the matter is that in the
latter part of August, 1946, no such activities had commenced. The only thing at that late date in the year 1946
which had been accomplished was that some work had
commenced in driving the tunnel under Wasatch Boulevard ; in fact, a trench half way across this thoroughfare
had been dug.
The court is referred to Exhibits YYY and ZZZ.
These exhibits are aerial photographs which were taken
August 16,1946. These pictures show that no work whatsoever had been started on what is now the pit floor, nor
any work been done to the east of Wasatch Boulevard.
Plaintiffs testified that this mountainside was defaced
in 1947, and in view of these particular pictures plaintiff s'
version as to this fact would seem to be the more reliable.
The operation of this gravel plant is quite extensive,
both as to area and construction. The panorama photographs, (Ex. B and Ex. H) together with a number of
other photographs, show this accurately. The evidence
shows, and there is little dispute that during the years
1947 and early part of 1948 this plant was constructed.
It began to operate in a somewhat tentative manner in
July of 1948. Considerable mechanical difficulty appeared, as could naturally be expected, which resulted in the
operation being quite sporadic. During the operational
part of 1948 the gravel was bulldozed from the mountain
east of Wasatch Boulevard onto a grizzly, from which it
dropped to a conveyor which carried the material beneath the Wasatch Boulevard by means of a tunnel to
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the crushing plant where it was crushed, graded, and
otherwise classified, and from which it was removed by
means of long conveyor belts to six storage piles.
In the spring of 1949 another method of removal of
this material from the mountain was devised. This was
necessary a the result of a lawsuit by Salt Lake City
against this defendant, with which this court is familiar.
This action by Salt Lake City required the defendant to
remove material from ground east of the city water conduit. Thereafter the material was mined a considerable
distance east of the boulevard and was conveyed to the
same grizzly by a conveyor belt and the material was
dropped from the end of this conveyor onto the grizzly
some 25 or 30 feet, as appears in the first two photographs of Exhibit W, and also in numerous other photographs.
By handling this material that way, the "fines,"
which were the undesirable ingredient in this product as
sand and gravel, were removed and blown away by the
wind, which at this particular point in the mouth of the
canyon blew almost constantly.
By August of 1949 all the "bugs" were out of the
plant and it started to produce sand and gravel steadily,
and huge amounts of this product were amassed on defendant's premises.
One of the aggravating features of this operation
was the noise produced by the crushing plant, the machinery used in conveying the material, and the heavy
equipment used in and around these stock piles.
5
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The most annoying result to these plaintiffs was the
daily deposit of dust on their premises. This dust is
practically powder, as testified to by Dr. Jones, the
engineer from the University of Utah, who analyzed it
at the pit, crusher, storage piles, outside the homes of
plaintiffs and inside the homes of plaintiffs. The doctor's
analysis is contained in Exhibits DDDD, EEEE and
F F F F . He and Dr. Hawks testified this material was
powder. It is interesting to note in this respect, however, that courser material was carried to these homes.
This material was gathered inside and outside houses
and was preserved, presented at the trial, and is contained in boxes as a part of the record. The fact that
this courser material traveled the distance from this plant
to the homes conclusively demonstrates the direction and
intensity of the winds in this vicinity.
Photographs were taken during the year 1949 and
during the summer immediately preceding the trial of
this case at regular intervals. These exhibits were consolidated, dated and range from exhibit C to exhibit UU.
These pictures, the dust and dirt actually collected, and
the analysis of the scientists called by plaintiffs, also the
direct testimony by plaintiffs and others, conclusively
show the injustice, inconvenience and discomfort they
underwent as a result of this plant being located and
operated where it was and as it was.
Defendant produced experts to refute this. These
people purported to be advised in matters of sound and
dust problems.
6
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Mr. Netzeband conducted certain dust collecting tests
in and around these premises for a number of weeks. The
instrument with which he collected dust was a device
which had an orifice of ten microns and the dust count
was made only on particles of five microns or less. Particles of this small size are classified as industrial dust.
The inhalation of this type of matter results in definite
physiological detriments.
Keferring to the analysis made by Dr. Jones on the
size of dust particles, Exhibits DDDD, EEEE, F F F F , it
will be seen that very little of the dust emitted from this
plant was of this size and so the conclusion of Mr. Netzeband would have no probative value in this case. It
should also be known that no method whereby dust fall
could be measured was undertaken by defendant, nor
was any procedure availed of by him to measure the
type of dust that was being transmitted and which could
be seen visually as coming from the premises of defendant.
Mr. Irvine conducted tests with sound equipment
which purported to indicate the intensity of the sound
caused by this plant compared to the intensity of the normal sounds in this vicinity when the plant was not operating and compared to various noise factors in different
districts in Salt Lake City. Among his findings were
readings taken at the crusher while it was in operation
and these were extremely high. He made tests on October
17, and October 18, 1950, while the plant was operating.
The ones taken on October 17, were at the crusher. On
7
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October 18, he took two readings. One of which was at the
Old Mill, the other was 800 feet from the crusher in
Draper's front yard. Both of these were made while the
plant was in operation. The only other readings he took
while the plant was in operation were on October 30,
when he took four readings at the Pedler and Draper
homes. On October 30, the wind in Salt Lake Valley at
the time these readings were made was toward the Northwest, i.e., from the direction of these properties toward
the crushing plant at from 19 to 37 miles per hour. Plaintiffs called Mr. Franklin Gates, a sound expert, to testify
in their behalf. He presented charts which showed that
sound intensity as measured in decibels was a very different thing as compared to loudness as felt by the human
ear. Mr. Irvine concurred with this principle. These
charts and the testimony of these experts indicate that
a slight change in intensity as measured by decibels results in a substantial increase or decrease in loudness
as heard by the human ear. It will also be noted that
Mr. Irvine's findings indicate substantial differences in
intensity between the times when tests were taken while
the plant was being operated and while it was shut down.
The matter of the testimony of these experts is
mentioned merely to show that the type and method of
their tests was not effective in controverting positive
testimony of plaintiffs supported by their expert testimony, photographs, and movies.
J. B. Walker carried the burden of defendant as to
practically all the matters appearing in the Statement
of Fact in defendant's brief. No employee of the crush8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ing plant was called to deny the fact testified to by plaintiffs that the dust from this plant was visually observable over the premises of plaintiffs.
Considerable evidence was presented by defendant
through Mr. Walker that dust was produced from Wasatch Boulevard, Cottonwood Boulevard and by the construction of the Deer Creek aqueduct. As opposed to this
testimony, plaintiffs testified that they were not bothered
by dust from these sources and that these same sources
did not produce dust. The record also shows that the
roads above mentioned were blacktopped in 1950 and that
the aqueduct was completed in 1949. This testimony
produced by defendant could not be effectual in view of
the fact that the most offensive period of operation of
this plant was in 1950.
Exception is taken to the statements appearing on
pages 2 and 3 of defendant's brief. There it is implied
that this crushing plant was a major factor in the economy of Salt Lake County. Mr. Walker testified to the
fact that of the $320,000.00 in sales in 1949, only $40,000.00 arose from revenue produced by the crushing plant.
Mr. Walker's testimony as to the production of his operation also appears to be somewhat exaggerated. He testified on cross examination (record 1104) that in 1949 his
gross income was $320,000.00. His income tax report (Ex.
SSSS) shows gross receipts of $272,000.00, of which
only $222,000.00 was from concrete products. No receipts
are shown for unprocessed sand and gravel on this
exhibit.
9
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On direct examination, Mr. Walker tried to make it
appear that this crushing plant represented a very substantial investment. On direct and cross examination
(record 1107 and 1110) he testified positively that the
crushing plant represented an investment of $308,000.00
and that the total investment in his overall operation was
$500,000.00 (record 1110). He was asked to produce his
income tax returns for 1948 and 1949, which were presented (Exhibits RRRR and SSSS). They show that in
1948 this plant had a depreciated value of $116,000.00,
based on a cost price of $128,000.00. The 1949 income tax
statement shows an investment in this plant of $145,000.00, depreciated to $119,000.00.
Relative values of investments may have some bearing in a nuisance case, but in this case it is fair to say that
the investment in this gravel plant is far less than the
investment plaintiffs and their neighbors had made in
the surrounding area at the time this plant was built.
Some evidence was received with regard to the existence of other sand and gravel operations in the Southeast section of Salt Lake County. There is no evidence
that dust, if any, produced by such operations affected
these plaintiffs in any manner.
Mr. Walker's testimony varied considerably from the
obvious facts. This was illustrated in his testimony as to
the production and amount of dust and noise, the existence of right of ways, and as to his investment. His evidence on the material matters involved in this action
10
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was not received favorably by the trial court, and it is
submitted that the trial court's action in failing to give
credence to this testimony was proper.

n
NO ERROR WAS MADE BY THE COURT IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND OR IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE.

Appellant's second point commencing at Page 74
in their brief argues to the effect that the Court erred in
allowing an amendment and in hearing evidence on the
issue of attractive nuisance.
The theory of plaintiffs on this point was that the
presence of these conveyors and machinery at a place
where they were easily accessible to children interferred
with the comfortable enjoyment of their life and property. Any activity which does this is under our statute
(R.S.TJ. 104-56-1) declared to be a nuisance.
The evidence submitted in support of this allegation
consisted of testimony to the effect that children of this
neighborhood were in the habit of playing around this
heavy equipment and climbing on to the ends of these
conveyor belts which were a considerable distance from
the ground. Also that the storage piles presented a dangerous condition due to the fact that the sand might slide,
thereby burying a child or that a child might fall in the
cone and drop into the center of such pile and thereby
become suffocated or injured by the equipment located
11
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under the pile. The evidence is undisputed that this plant
was left unguarded and unattended at the times the children were found playing there.
It would seem to require no argument that such a
dangerous condition being made immediately available
to children of tender years would interfere with the comfort and enjoyment of their parents.
The maintenance or operation of devices inherently
dangerous to occupants of adjacent lands is subject to
injunction. This principle was decided in a recent California case of Alanso v. Hills, 214 P. 2d 50 Cal. (1950).
In this case blasting on the premises of the defendant was
enjoined by those living in the immediate vicinity. This
case and the cases collected there hold that negligence
need not be proved as is contended by appellant.
Appellant cites a case and a treatise which expounds
the general principals of attractive nuisance. No cases
are cited which support its contention in this case.
The only objection made to this amendment and the
evidence admitted thereunder was that this evidence
"must have influenced the Court" in making its finding
and that there was a sharp or close question of fact presented by the evidence.
The proposition of this evidence influencing the trial
court cannot be sustained because the trial court made
no findings to the effect that the business conducted by
defendant amounted to an attractive nuisance. The trial
court confined its findings upon which it based a nuisance
12
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to the presence of dust, noise, and flashing lights. The
evidence was sufficient to support a finding of nuisance
on these grounds and the appellant herein makes no objection to this finding on these grounds.
The other argument made by appellant to the effect
that there was a close question of fact and a sharp conflict
in the evidence is also without merit. A reading of this
record and an examination of the exhibits submitted
shows conclusively that the overwhelming weight of the
evidence is in favor and upholds the findings of the trial
court as made.
Appellant could have insisted that findings be made
on this particular fact. In all likelihood such a finding
would have been to the effect that the existence of this
crushing plant did not constitute an attractive nuisance
so far as the children of plaintiffs were concerned and
that its presence did not affect their comfortable enjoyment of property. The failure of the trial court to find
that this fact existed implies a negative finding and
shows conclusively that the trial court did not consider
this factor in arriving at its decision which was based
on grounds it enumerated.
Briefly, defendant's contention on this point stands
unsupported by authority and is to the effect that the
introduction of this issue and evidence prejudiced the
Judge's decision in respondents' favor. It is submitted
that such a contention is without merit and wholly over13
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looks the finding of the Court and over-whelming weight
of plaintiff's evidence supporting such finding to which
objection is not made.
III.
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE IS IN PROPER FORM
AND THE TRIAL COURT WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION
TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS UPON DEFENDANT'S USE OF
ITS PROPERTY IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE ON THIS
ISSUE.

Upon the trial of this case, the court was presented
with the problem of whether a nuisance existed or
whether it did not. The pleadings were so framed. The
only defenses presented were (1) laches and (2) denial
of the fact that a nuisance condition was present.
The contention of defendant that the court should
have limited its injunctive order would have some merit
if defendant in its pleading had admitted the fact of nuisance and presented a scheme or method whereby such a
nuisance could be eliminated, if possible, by certain mechanical or scientific processes. In such case the court
could then determine whether such changes would produce the desired result and rule on that matter. This procedure was followed in the Utah case of Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Company, 137 P. 2d 347, Utah
(1943).
There are numerous cases where this type of defense
has been made. The courts under such evidence have
permitted a continuance of the activity which had there14
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tofore resulted in a nuisance under new or anticipated
procedures which were pleaded and proved at the trial.
That is the situation in the cases cited in defendant's
brief.
There might be numerous ways and different procedures whereby defendant's plant in this case could be
operated so as not to create this abundant dust and loud
noise, such as housing the crusher and the application of
liberal supplies of water. The trial court cannot, and
should not be required to make an independent investigation of the methods involved in the processing of sand
and gravel and from such investigation determine if there
is any manner under which the nuisance feature of such
an activity can be controlled. Then, after such investigation, restrict the operation of a given plant until the conditions that have been discovered by the court are complied with. This, obviously, is not the duty of the court.
The trial court is only required to find facts which have
been properly pleaded and presented by way of evidence
to it. That is just exactly what the court did in this case.
It is too late in this case for this defendant to raise this
particular problem.
Respondents do not deny that the operation of a
gravel processing plant is a legal business. There have
been numerous cases decided, both in this jurisdiction
and others, which declare that an activity which produces loud noise and which results in dust and other foreign substances being deposited on other people's property is a nuisance. In these cases such activity was ad15
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mittedly a lawful occupation. These cases are collected
in an annotation at 11 A.L.K. 1401. This annotation
is entitled "Dust as Nuisance." Our Supreme Court has
held that noise is a nuisance in Brough v. JJte Stampede
Association 142 P. 2d 670. Also dust is a nuisance in
Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Company, 231 P.
813.
At this point it is proper to note that the trial court
did not enjoin this defendant's operation of a gravel
plant at this particular place. A proposed decree to this
effect was not executed by the court. The decree as
signed enjoins the defendant from operating its gravel
pit and process plant including the storing of different
products and the operation of heavy equipment upon
these premises so as to create a nuisance affecting plaintiffs.
.. , . , , The language of this decree leaves the door open to
defendant to continue the operation of this establishment in the event it can be operated without creating
noises and excessive amounts of dust. No objection to
this form of decree was made by defendant at or after
the time it was entered by the Court nor was any scheme
or device for the control of this dust and noise propounded when the matter of the form of this decree was
being argued by respective counsel.
Appellant cites the case of Vowinchel v. N. Clark and
Son, 216 Cal. 156, 136 Pac. (2nd) 733. In this case plaintiff brought a nuisance action against a manufacturer
of pipe and tile. The factory had been adjacent to plain16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tiff's premises for a number of years. The objectionable
feature of this operation was the addition of four furnaces on the side of the plant next to plaintiff. The court
viewed the premises and held that these particular furnaces were objectionable and forbade their use. The defendant in this case, after the trial and on the motion
for a new trial, offered to build a sound and fireproof
wall, but the court refused to accept this solution. This
case can by no means be cited as authority for the proposition that the court on its own initiative should investigate factors which would abate a nuisance.
Appellant cites the case of Williams v. Bluebird
Laundry Company, 259 Pac. 484. The language of the
decree in this case appears to be the same as the language in the case at bar. The same objection to it was
made as is being made in this case, and the court held
that such an objection is without merit. The court in the
Bluebird Laundry Company case cites the case of Judson
v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Company, 157 Cal. 168,
106 Pac. 581. The language of the decree in the Suburban
Gas Company case was the same as in the case at bar.
The defendant there made the same objection as is being
made here, yet the court held the language proper. The
California court said:
"It is these objectionable emanations, the
same sort of nuisance which had caused the annoyance to plaintiffs, that are enjoined. Even if true,
it is no objection to the validity of an order that
there is room for difference of opinion as to what
noises are loud, what odors are offensive, and
what smoke is black."
17
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The court then goes on to say that under this form
of a decree, both the defendant and the plaintiffs are
sufficiently protected.
The court continued:
"If the operation of the defendant's plant
should be deemed by the plaintiffs to create such
noises or pollution of the atmosphere as to be
deleterious to their health or offensive to their
senses, and should they produce competent and
satisfactory evidence that any or all of these objectionable features were injuring or destroying
their health, we think they would be entitled to
relief under the terms of the judgment, otherwise
not."
These two California cases hold squarely that a decree in the language of this case is sufficiently definite
and can be enforced under existing legal procedures. The
only distinction that appellant makes between this case
and the two California cases, which appear to be exactly
in point, is that the operation of a gravel plant is a more
complicated process than the operation of a steam laundry and a factory which produces gas. It is submitted
that a process which merely grades and reduces the size
of rock is in no way as complicated nor are there as many
processes used in such activity as there is in a business
which reduces coal or some other combustible to gas,
or to the laundering of various types of clothing.
The court's directive states clearly that the processing and storage of this material created dust, and that
18
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the operation of equipment created noise, and the decree
of the court is that this activity be conducted so as not
to produce dust or noise.
The next objection to the form of this decree is that
it refers to the Findings of Fact in the event more particularity is desired and for reference as to the manner
of operation. Such a reference does not render the decree
inoperative. It is submitted that such practice is the
better procedure, as indicated in Barron and Holtzoff,
Section 1436, page 314-15, Vol. I l l , where it is stated that
the order should furnish the defendant with a direct and
succinct statement of his wrongful acts and should not
incorporate lengthy and verbose findings.
It is also true that under our practice the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree are
considered more or less as a whole, and represent the
court's final determination of a given lawsuit. Rule 52A,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provide that,
"The court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon and
direct the entry of the appropriate judgment,"
This was done in this case. The findings of fact represent
the grounds for relief and the decree granted the appropriate relief.
Appellant maintains that this reference to the findings violates Rule 65A (D) Utah Civil Procedure, which
provides that every order granting an injunction shall
be specific at all times and shall describe in detail and
not by reference to the complaint or other document the
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act or acts sought to be restrained. This is a codification
of the common law rule. And the Bluebird Laundry
and Suburban Gas Company cases above quoted hold
squarely that the order and decree in this case is sufficiently specific and does sufficiently describe the acts
to be restrained.
Commencing at page 105 of appellant's brief the
argument is presented that there exist other sand and
gravel operations in the general area and that the evidence showed there were other dust producing agencies.
This is in direct conflict to the weight of the evidence.
As to this argument, the undisputed evidence is that these
people had lived in this neighborhood for many years
and were never disturbed by dust or noise previous to the
operation of defendant's plant. In fact, the testimony
of plaintiffs was that the area was unusually quiet and
dust free. It is also undisputed that these other gravel
plants mentioned were in existence before defendant's
plant was built, yet these plaintiffs had no cause of
complaint.
•

Even if it had been shown that other purported
sources indicated by appellant annoyed these plaintiffs,
such would not be a defense. The rule in this respect
is clearly stated in the Vowinckel case, supra, 13 Pac. 2d
at page 737, where the defendant contended that the
plaintiff in addition to itself had as neighbors an airport on the North and a railroad on the South. Citing a
long line of California cases the court declares the rule
to be:
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"The fact that other sources of possible discomfort to plaintiff existed in the neighborhood
of his property is no defense to an action of this
kind. * * * Nor will the adoption of the most approved appliances and methods of production
justify the continuance of that which in spite of
them remains a nuisance."
The whole problem of the form of this decree and its
failure to specify or permit the operation of this gravel
plant under some kind of a scheme which the judge should
have independently discovered has been rendered moot.
The file in this case has been continued and will be offered upon the oral argument hereof. Subsequent to the
entry of this decree and in the summer of 1951, while
this appeal was being perfected, an order to show cause
was issued by the trial court, upon which a contempt
order against this defendant and J. B. Walker was entered. After further hearing defendant finally advanced
a proposal which in its estimation would reduce the dust
and noise factor incident to the operation of this crushing plant. The trial court heard this evidence and is
allowing defendant to operate after these features are
constructed and installed.
CONCLUSIONS
1. So far as the nuisance question is concerned,
Article 8 Section 9 of the Utah Constitution may not be
invoked in this case as requested by appellant, This
particular rule of law is to the effect that in equity cases
the appellate court can investigate the findings and as21
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certain whether or not the proof justifies the findings.
In this case no objection is made to the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings of a nuisance, and
therefore the appellate court is under no duty or obligation to investigate or go into the evidence.
2. Finally, appellant in their conclusions request
that this court reform this judgment by defining methods,
instruments and agencies, and to define a maximum tolerance of dust fall in this case. For this court to do this
it would have to make an independent investigation as
to permissible limits of dust fall with no aid from appellant by way of evidence having been presented on this
subject at the trial of the case and without the aid of
having anything submitted to this court. Such a proposal
appears upon its face to be beyond the scope of review.
3. As indicated by the extensiveness of this record,
both by way of oral testimony and exhibits, it is readily
apparent that considerable time, effort and money was
contributed by the parties hereto in presenting the matter
fully to the trial court. It is submitted that such evidence
preponderates heavily in favor of respondents and that
the trial court's findings and decision were in all respects
correct and proper.
Eespectfully submitted,
MULLINER, PRINCE AND MULLINER
Attorneys for all Plaintiffs and Respondents
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